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76 LAW AND 
and for The theories to pro· 
natural like the natural the physK world. 
this is not enough. alone will 'Ot do. 
Consequently, there is a resurgence lately of who for 
norms and values by which laws can judged and evalu . .i!ed as weil as 
described. Primarily of the Kantian school, thinkers such a;;, DworkL1, 
Rawls, Nozick, and Gewirth, disparate as their solutions may be, ;;;ll seek 
to impregnate the law from without, as it were, with ethical theories based 
on a state of consensus, or the underlying principles of a liberal 
political system, or on the notion of man as an active agent. In a fun­
damental way, many modern moral philosophers have accepted the 
"scientific" view that the study of law in itself can provide little if any 
knowledge of what law ought to be. For that, we must go outside of law 
(and to develop the normative yardsticks. 
It is the of this short note that this recent turn of philosophical 
events has resulted in two complementary artificialities. First, it is ar­
tificial to conceive of law in a non-normative "scientific" manner. Se­
cond, it is equally to look entirely outside of the law for stan­
dards by which to its and badness. The problem lies, I 
believe, in to law a of science that is manifestly inap­
propriate to its it would follow, would be to utilize 
a theory of science more to the object of study. 
II 
The vision many modern scientific theories 
shows us than is perspectives on law offered by 
modern science may aid us pragmatically, for example, in determining 
whether a legislated highway speed limit will decrease energy con­
sumption more than increase the costs of longer travel time. Certainly, 
technological inform legislators and courts of what harms to 
avoid and how to against them. science techniques can 
decision-making, inform us of the effec­
the centers of authority in a society, 
or tell us what results from a particular 
But, I submit, modern science can tell us little 
le1·eu11oie:1ccu perspective, we never 
what it is that civilizations call law. I know 
doctrine of the final cause has been buried a hun· 
dred times or more. Yet the teleological view returns, only 
slightly and without a trace of It takes 
no effort on my to aid in one more for I think 
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models su~ceeding one another without mofam. development, or pur­
pose. Reality was static, and what seemed be movement was 
reallJ'. only a succession of slightly different new worlds recreated by 
God m the way we today would see a "motion" picture there is in 
truth only a series of stills taken by a cameraman. Humean 
theory of causality and the later Regularity Theory were the logical pro­
geny of 
Because of the Cartesian and Kantian triumph over the result is 
that today science can never know the nature of any thing, 
never discern what any thing is in itself. What science can do is to order 
the manifestations of things and to discover methods (technology) of 
manipulating those (for whatever reason) to desired ends . 
. What does ':'eat~h's reveal to us regarding law? For one thing, 
1t follows that 1f science can never discover the nature of any thing, it can 
never reveal the nature of law. Instead, we can have competing para­
dig~s of what law is among various positivists, each with differing 
logical strengths and but all being contrived or structured 
models of various phenomena denoted as "legal." We look to differing 
views of law as efficient means to socially desirable ends. Quite ap­
propriately, we find that gaps in moral theory that the positivists 
leave are attempted to filled by Kantian moral theorists who also, to 
the extent follow the leader, admit that the nature of things 
in can never be known. 
In contrast, the Aristotelian theory of science holds that the nature of 
any thing can be known, and it is determined in particular (quite literally 
in particular) by its "end" or final state of actualization toward which it 
tends. All things, say Aristotelians, are in motion (actively or 
passively) toward an actualization of their respective potentialities, that 
is to say, toward a state of being that would constitute any thing's 
"perfection" were it ever to be reached. 
I suggest that, in the case of law especially, our experience makes such 
a teleological view much more appropriate and susceptible of discover­
ing the reality of law-in-itself more than any other scientific theory can 
do at the present time. For is it not true that law is constantly in motion? 
When we see how law actually is it not always changing at the 
instigation of agents as lawyers, judges, legislators, as well as many 
other "law-making" agents in a society? Further, is it not evident that 
these are never Do we not speak of the develop­
ment of law? many may conflict in their effects, but all 
changes in the law are . 
Law then is in motion; it is moved purposefully by agents toward an 
end. What end?, we may ask. What, in fact, is the defining purpose of 
law? To put it it I the accomplishment of a proper 
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL LAWS 
ordering of social relations among men. 
of ordering of relations, distinguishable 
mechanisms or ordering, such as custom, 
also, law is directed toward a proper for no movement 
(change) in law can be understood apart from a result that is seen 
mover as "good." In this short piece I cannot 
personality. And what norm would indeed constitute a proper"'"''"'"'""''" 
relationships? I leave this to others in the 
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that the of all who work in 
tests that indeed it is an institution in constant 
peculiar end of a proper ordering of relations among men. 
III 
No doubt, it will be evident I have thus pinned 
teleological view of law on a rational reflection of our 
of the law. Indeed, I am suggesting that, at in law if not 
things, a teleological perspective is only a rational articulation 
we humans experience of something in a dynamic state 
Through that experience, we can rationally discern 
the thing we are looking at. 
A very few decades ago, during the heyday of 
existential movement flowered in Western 
that existentialists found in the world (and frequently put into their own 
writings) they possessed an insight that we would do well to note. 
existentialist philosophers and dramatists were in revolt 
peared to them to be the sterile rationality of 
They saw that philosophy was not only irrelevant to 
perience of human life but also that in many cases the ""·"'u""' 
did not even care that it was irrelevant. Th~se activities which 
the depths of human experience literature, 
were outside of rational knowledge. 
analyzed rationally . what the structure was 
Symphony," or how influenced 
say, Buddha - but the intellectuals could not 
periencing the "Fifth Symphony," or in 
upon the example of Buddha. And even the 
the reality of being human was in human 
"meaningful" (i.e., rational) theme to 
But what told us was that an 
not of the reality of things as 
by definition, us a full human of 
looked at. Accordingly, to understand law, we must 
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tionally, but our rational must not be confined to law's 
appearances, but to law through and through, to law as we experience it. 
We up the experiential component of rationality (common sense, 
if you will) only at the expense of up part of our humanity. A ra­
tional reflection of knowing things as they are. No 
one, not even Descartes I his life in microseconds 
of successive static states of being. No static Cartesian model of law can 
meet, or even to meet, the reality of the thing as humans ex­
perience it. To law as a command backed by a sanction or that 
its ultimate articulation is by judges can tell us some things that may be 
observational data of law, but they do not tell us what law is. Such 
definitions us nothing by which we can make rational sense of the 
experience law. 
Now, every ....,,,.N,.... of law is of rules, fixed and deter­
minate in their at any moment in time, but the whole of which is 
in a state of change. The attempt to portray 
law "scientifically" as did, to a "pure" formula of describing 
it, simply runs counter to the of all those who work with it, 
whether they be lawyers, or citizens. When we ask 
ourselves why law is always in a state of change, the evident answer is, 
once that it is moved in order to accomplish its end, to actualize its 
potentiality if you will, of the proper of relations among 
men, not only individually but in other constituents such as the 
family, clan, guild, church, and state. In sum, without a sense of law's 
purpose, we can no of the very nature of the legal 
enterprise. 
IV 
Within my limits l can only some of the most essential and 
salutary implications of a view of law. 
To begin, by an end to law which informs us of the nature 
of law, we in no-wise to find that law ever empirically reaches that 
end. man, law may toward the of its innate 
potentialities without ever fulfilling them. Nor is this a cause 
for On where a mechanical positivist view of law 
bright so tc or exclude certain social rules as 
either law or not-law, a of law permits judgments 
to be made on a moved toward its 
make 
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of justification. A modern scientific approach to law can rio•~rr•ho 
phenomenon, but not justify it. It can tell us some of 
law, at least as they appear to but in no way do we know 
law is, that is, what is its nature, why it is what is it about. 
the attempt to leaven legal science with 
itself lacks. But by using the telos as an type," we cannot 
deseribe the legal enterprise, we can make justifiable 
how "well" it is doing. Since law seeks a 
among men (which we customarily call 
whether indeed a law is just or not. 
The fact of the matter is that all know that the law 
know that the changes are not undirected to any 
Roman candles set off in any direction. We can evaluate a 
structure as a better or worse ordering, an 
its purpose. The law may be inefficient, it 
disorder. It may, in other words, fail to create On 
it may create order but for such an infamous end that we can 
call such law "perverted," creating an order to its true purpose. 
In a word, it may be just or unjust. 
Similarly, we can apply the same not 
to the worth of individual laws. We can gauge the "'"r1'n"''"'0 
of laws not only by whether they 
whether they actualize the proper order 
And this brings us face to face with a 
describe a legal system but in the same terms 
standard derived from the nature of law 
not an external morality which 
to the whole enterprise. First of all, 
dard in a literal sense because it describes 
plicit in the nature of law without which law could not 
would then have a different nature 
dition, and somewhat redundantly, natural 
evaluative standard. We need not seek an 
value-free science of law. The standard is a 
very nature. To speak about what the proper .wr•"~'"" 
merely to ask what should be the norm consistent 
That is all that is meant by natural law and that is all 
mean. Indeed, to find out what "right" in 
ethical philosophy as if it were a discipline. 
logically to natural law which interstitially 
from bad, or even, in law's nature, 
all. 
This of course brings us to the content of 
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of the teleological view which I once somewhat artlessly 
.,,.,~a.l.:>c of the:1 scope paper. Nonetheless, we can still fruitfully 
~--,·~~··'M whether natural the observance of procedural norms 
only, as Lon Fuller to or whether there are also neces­
sary substantive aspects to the of law's purpose. 
It will be that Fuller discerned a number of "desiderata" to 
what he morality" of law. They included principles of 
generality, limited retroactivity, clarity, limited con­
tradictions, of relative constancy, and consis­
tent enforcement. procedural norms were necessary for law to be 
law. Although norms were unenforceable, were they absent then a 
proposed "rule" would not be law because the nature of the law as defined 
by its end would have been fatally undermined. These are constitutive 
rules, intrinsically to the legal enterprise. That is why Fuller 
calls them "lower laws" than "higher laws." 
Fuller that his eight are not rigid norms each of 
which must fulfilled. Rather, they may in some cases be ad­
justed so that the purpose of the law is fulfilled. Consequently, 
security may require a secret law whose ill effects are later 
cured by a retroactive law. This highlights one of the salient features of 
natural law, one that is to many positivists, namely, that 
natural law's norms are only in relation to the telos. The ac­
tual practice of a natural law jurisprudence is strikingly dependent on the 
virtue of 
By championing a view over those who assumed that law 
was of inert matter," Fuller that the mere concentra­
tion on structure neglected "the purposive activity this structure is 
assumed to " But purposive activity require certain 
substantive as well as calling for a number of procedural 
means? ls law substantive too? 
Fuller to draw a line between the procedural and substantive 
of natural law, but despite his the criticisms of H. L.A. 
Hart edged him across that line. Where Hart said that there was no 
logical connection values and subsequent "good" 
laws, Fuller replied the inner morality law will tend toward pro­
ducing external it is dependent on a view of "man's 
dignity as a " Responsible to what? we might ask. 
Responsible to his nature as a human person, we might answer. 
And there we have it law's potentialities is therefore 
on what will man's potentialities. The "good" of law 
cannot be of man. And thus we are drawn in­
evitably in a teleological frame­
work. 
LAV\' 
primary of law's 
the purpose of law. Law's 
A true teleological view 
that the legal regime of Nazi 
U.S.S.R. is a perversion of the law, for it 
cedurally and substantively. I for now 
Cicero, Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez, Duguit, 
Grisez, Finnis, Veatch, and others over what 
per end of man. But if we can find that the 
tion, or apartheid is contrary to that we may 
those positive rules are either not law (in 
lawful) or that they are, in the true sense of 
clusions have been reached by thinkers of 
Modern science has developed the notion of 
the apparent sequential patterns of the most 
physical world. But it cannot tell us what we ought to do 
production, or human sexuality, or 
teleological science can no more tell us that 
than it can tell us what is the natural purpose of 
Natural law, however, can tell us what to be done in 
nature of law. If indeed the nature of law is 
accomplishment (actualization) the proper 
and effective structure) of relations 
(human persons in their various states 
justifiable evaluative We can 
just or unjust, wise or stupid What 
is equipped to do. 
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